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DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR THE BAY
OF CAMPECHE OIL SPILL
I. FACTS
On June 3, 1979, a massive blowout occurred approximately thirty-eight
miles from shore on the high seas in the Bay of Campeche, Gulf of Mexico.,
At the time, exploratory drilling operations were being conducted on the
2
Ixtoc I oil well by Sedco 135, a mobile semisubmersible drilling rig. The rig
was owned by the Dallas-based drilling company, Sedco, Inc. The blowout
resulted in a fire and in a discharge of oil of between ten and thirty thousand
barrels a day into the Gulf of Mexico.' By August 1979, the resulting oil slick4
extended along the coast of Texas from Brownsville to Matagorda Island.
The slick sullied privately owned beaches, coastal public parks and fishing
areas during the summer tourist season.' Fall and winter storms periodically
caused renewed contamination of the Texas territorial waters and shore.' The
well was finally capped nine months later on March 25, 1980.'
Sedco, Inc. had leased the rig to Perforaciones Marinas del Golfo, S.A.
[hereinafter "Permargo"], a private Mexican drilling contractor;' Sedco had
also contracted to provide personnel and spare parts for the drilling
operations to Permargo' Permargo was operating under a drilling contract
with Petroleos Mexicanos [hereinafter "Pemex"], the Mexican national oil
company."°
In anticipation of suit, Sedco filed a motion on September 11, 1979, under
2
the Limitation of Liability Act to exonerate itself from liability. Alternatively, it moved to limit liability to $300 thousand, a figure representing the
value of the rig after the blowout and Sedco's earnings from its contracts with
Permargo.1"

1. In Re Complaint of Sedco, Inc., Civ. No. H-79-1880 (S.D. Tex., filed Sept. 1,
1979). Original Claim of the State of Texas, at 2.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2-3.
4. Id., Original Answer of Tex., at 1. [hereinafter OriginalAnswer].
5. Id.
6. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
7. Id.
8. Original Answer, supra note 4, at 1.

9. Id.
10. Id. Sedco had no direct contact with Pemex.
11. 46 U.S.C. §§ 182-189 (1851).
12. In Re Complaint of Sedco, Civ. No. H-79-1880, at 1.
13. Id. at 4.
(55)
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In accordance with Supplemental Rule F(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the federal government had to consolidate any claims it intended
to pursue against Sedco with the limitation of liability proceeding. The
United States government successfully moved to join statutory and negligence counter-claims against Sedco with its claim that Sedco was not entitled
to limit its liability." The United States alleged contamination of the
navigable waters of its two hundred mile fisheries zone, of the waters above
the continental shelf and adjacent uplands owned by the United States, and
15
alleged damage to the resources pertaining to those waters. Further, the
federal claim alleged liability against Sedco in rem and in personam for
cleanup expenses of $6 million which the Coast Guard had incurred to
remove and treat the oil."6
The State of Texas moved to consolidate its statutory, negligence and
trespass claims with the federal claim against Sedco.' 7 Texas joined a claim
against Permargo for $175 thousand as joint tortfeasor for replacement or
restoration of damaged natural resources and compensation for current oil
removal costs. 8 The State alleged loss of tax revenues due to the impact of
the oil spill on the state's tourism and seafood industries and on the general
economy of the affected coastal area." Further, the State sought reimbursement for expenses it incurred to mitigate the effects of widespread press
0
coverage of the oil spill upon the tourist and recreational industries.
Private parties joined four separate class actions and forty-seven private
actions against Pemex and Permargo with the Sedco limitation action,
alleging a total of more than $300 million in damages.2 The class actions

14. in Re Complaint of Sedco, Civ. No. H-79-1880 (S.D. Tex., Oct., 1979) (Order
granting legal proceedings against parties other than Sedco and permitting the United
States to consolidate separate statutory causes of action with the limitation of liability
proceeding).
15. Id., Claim of the United States, at 2.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id., Texas Motion to file a Complaint and for Consolidation, at 1-2.
18. Id., Original Claim of the State of Texas, at 3. The State claims damages in
excess of $10 million, subject to amendment to a limit of $50 million, when further
information regarding the full impact of the oil spill on the State's ecological system
can be assessed. The State is also claiming $100 thousand damages for reimbursement
of oil removal costs, and seventy-five thousand dollars in civil penalties for violations of
the Texas Water Code. Id. at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In Re Complaint of Sedco, List of Claimants. Pursuant to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1976), PEMEX, although an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign government, § 1603(b), is not entitled to jurisdictional
immunity. It committed an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
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represent fishermen, 22 Willacy County, Texas claims on behalf of property
owners and lessees, 2 and private parties dependent on tourism for their
livelihood."
The following discussion attempts to demonstrate that relief for any of
the parties will be difficult to obtain. Neither domestic nor international law
was designed to deal with blowouts occurring on the high seas. Recent
international conventions focus on vessel source pollution. Such a focus is the
result of two factors: the difference between the average amount of oil
discharged from the spill of an oil tanker as compared with that resulting
from an oil blowout; and the less frequent occurrence of oil blowouts. For
example, the Torrey Canyon oil tanker disaster released a record nineteen
million gallons of oil into the English Channel; 2 although the worst in
history,' the Ixtoc I blowout only discharged approximately three hundred
thousand gallons of oil over a ten month period.27 Oil blowouts occur at a
2
lesser rate of approximately 2.5 per 1000 wells drilled.
While current domestic legislation does exist to cover pollution from oil
blowouts, its applicability extends only to the two hundred mile limit;
2
monetary liability is restricted; and private parties have no right of action. '
The effectiveness of this legislation is further impaired by the continued
2
applicability of the antiquated 1851 Limitation of Liability Act.' The 1851
1
Act severely diminishes a polluter's liability in certain circumstances.
Legislation passed by the House, September 19, 1980,1 popularly known
as the Superfund,33 would cure some of these defects. The bill raises the fund
with a commercial activity of the foreign state which caused a direct effect in the
United States. § 1605(a)(2). For a previous denial of immunity to PEMEX, see e.g. S.T.
Tringali Co. v. The Tug PEMEX XV, 274 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Tex. 1967); United States
v. Tug PEMEX XV, 1 A.M.C. 896 (1960).
22. In Re Complaint of Sedco, Oct. 1979) Civ. No. H-79-1892 (S.D. Tex., Oct.,
1979). Fishermen, shrimpers, crabbers and oystermen are claiming damages in the
amount of $155 million, at 1.
23. Id. These parties are Intervenors in Civ. No. H-79-1892.
24. In Re Complaint of Sedco, Civ. No. H-79-2389 (S.D. Tex., Oct., 1979). The
private parties' claim is for $100 million.
25. S. RlP. No. 95-427, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1977).
26. 125 CONGR. REc. H 6365, (daily ed. Jul. 20, 1979).
27. See supra note 3.
28. R. EASTON, BLACK TIDE 8 (1972).
29. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
30. U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (1851).
31. See text, infra, at 59-62.
32. H.R. 85, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. (1979).
33. H.R. 85 is to be distinguished from H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980),
which is also called "Superfund," but deals strictly with hazardous substances other
than oil.
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limit from which compensation is paid from a present maximum of $50
3
million to $200 million, ' provides for strict liability for removal costs,"
37
'
grants private parties and States a private right of action, and recognizes
'
claims for property damage and for economic loss. Hence, under this
legislation, all the plaintiffs to the Sedco suit would be granted relief. Unless
0
the bill or one similar to it is passed by the Senate, however, private parties
must rely on traditional common law claims such as negligence, nuisance,
trespass or strict liability for damage caused by offshore drilling operations.
Mexico and the United States have taken steps to reach an agreement
regarding cooperation in the prevention of pollution. For example, a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed June 6, 1979, establishing norms
for cooperation between the two countries on environmental programs." Last
year the United States National Response Team proposed a joint United
States-Mexican Contingency Plan to deal with oil and other hazardous
chemical pollution." The Plan calls for a coordinated and integrated response
to pollution incidents by both governments; it addresses the question of
organization and funding. Hopefully, an agreement can be reached similar to
the one which exists between Canada and the United States on offshore
drilling operations. The US-Canadian agreement provides for strict liability
for any pollution in the Beaufort Sea resulting from oil exploration
activities. The plethora of existing and planned oil drilling operations" in
the Gulf of Mexico underscores the urgent need for a similar agreement with
Mexico. However, the Ixtoc I blowout must be decided under the provisions of
existing domestic legislation and international law. Thus, the following
discussion will focus on present potential sources of recovery and the reasons
why they provide inadequate relief.

34. See supra note 32, at § 102(a).
35. Id., at § 104(a).
36. Id., at § 103(b)(2), (4).
37. Id., at § 103(b)(5).
38. Id. at § 103(a)(2), (3).
39. Id., at § 103(a)(6).
40. H.R. 85 is stalled in Senate Committee.
41. 17 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1056 (1978).
42. Hearings Before the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm. and the Water
Resources Subcomm. of the Public Works and Transp. Comm., Sept. 8-9, 1979, Blowout of the Mexican Oil Well: Ixtoc 1, Corpus Christi, Tex. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 80
(Statements of Rear Adm. Paul A. Yost, Comm'r., 18th Coast Guard Dist. (1980)).
43. United States-Canada Accord Regarding Oil Spill Liability, 1974, 25 U.S.T.
1280, T.I.A.S. No. 7861.
44. PEMEX announced its intention to drill fifty offshore oil wells in the Gulf of
Mexico between Oct. and March, 1979-80. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1979, § 1, at 2, Col. 3.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY

I.

A.

UNITED STATES LEGISLATION

1851 Limitation of Liability Act 5

Arguably, the Limitation of Liability Act presents the greatest possible
bar to recovery. The Act provides that the liability of a vessel owner shall not
exceed the value of his interest in the vessel and its pending freight.'" In
Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co. v. Wright,'7 the Supreme Court held that the
owner's interest should be calculated according to the value of the ship and
her cargo after the cause of the loss had occurred.45 In accordance with the
Wright interpretation, Sedco is seeking to limit its liability to $300 thousand
-

the value of the rig after the blowout and its earnings from its contracts

with Permargo. 49 The Sedco case illustrates the enormous gap that exists
between limited liability on the oen hand and the actual amount of damages
which one will be held accountable for on the other. Even the $20 million
Sedco has collected in insurance' falls far short of the more than $360
million of damage claims in the instant case.
The two major issues to be determined regarding the applicability of the
Limitation Act are whether or not the accident was within the "privity or
knowledge of the owner,"5 and whether an offshore drilling rig can be
classified as a vessel.
The vessel owner may only limit his liability if the damage was not
within his "privity and knowledge." "Within the privity and knowledge" has
been defined to mean that the owner is aware of the fault in his vessel that
caused the accident.52 Whether or not Sedco had knowledge of the cause of the
accident on the Ixtoc I is a complex fact question. Sedco did have personnel on
board. It is unclear exactly what authority was vested in the Sedco personnel
or what responsibility was assumed by the charterers, Permargo and Pemex,
who also had management personnel onboard the rig.0
Similarly, the answer to the second issue under the Limitation Act,
whether a semisubmersible drilling rig can qualify as a "vessel," is unclear.
The Act itself defines vessels as "all seagoing vessels, and

. . .

vessels used

on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including boats, barges, and

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

46 U.S.C. §§ 183-189 (1851).
Id., at § 183(a).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871).
Id. at 113.
See supra note 13.
Am. Law., Dec. 1979, at 13.
46 U.S.C. § 183(a).
U.S. v. Ohio Valley Co., Inc., 516 F.2d 1184, 1186 (7th Cir., 1975).
See supra note 4.
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lighters."' 4 The compound structure of the Act's definition suggests an
intention to differentiate between "seagoing vessels," and "boats, barges, and
lighters," craft which travel only on inland waterways. Webster's Dictionary
defines "seagoing" as "designed or adapted for sailing the open sea in
distinction from rivers or harbors."-H The Sedco 135 was stationed on the high
seas and has, in fact, covered a distance of 15,947 miles in long distance tows
over the high seas., The question remains whether a structure that is not
self-propelled and is stationary during most of its operative life is sufficiently
mobile to fall within the Act's definition of "seagoing."
A semisubmersible rig is arguably analogous to a barge, and thus
qualifies as "seagoing" under the second half of the Act's definition of
t"vessels." Both are used in transportation. The former transports equipment;
the latter transports cargo. Some barges, like the Sedco 135, are not
self-propelled, but are towed by tugs.
Fifth Circuit interpretations of the term "vessel" have varied according
to context and the statutes involved. Mobile drilling rigs have generally been
found to be "vessels" in the context of Jones Act cases. 5 7 However, in Cook v.
Belden Concrete Products, Inc.,' the Fifth Circuit drew a confusing distinction: submersible drilling barges and floating dredges were found to be
within general maritime jurisdiction, even while moored." The Court
reasoned that they are exposed to-the hazards of the sea and are designed for
navigation and commerce.' They are equipped for transportation of passengers, cargo or equipment from place to place across navigable waters. A
floating construction platform, on the other hand, was held not to be a vessel
when engaged in its primary function as a stationary construction platform."'
The Court drew an analogy between such a construction platform and dry
docks to which the Fifth Circuit had not yet accorded vessel status.62
Like submersible drilling barges, the Sedco 135 is designed for navigation and subject to the risks and hazards of the sea. The rig is subject to the
54. 46 U.S.C. § 188.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L Dic. (4th Ed. 1976).
56. In Re Complaint of Sedco, Inc., Civ. No. H-79-1880, Memo. of Sedco in

55.

Opposition to Claimants' Motion to Dismiss, at 4.
57. Mobile drilling rigs were found to be "vessels" in Hicks v. Ocean Drilling and
Exploration Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1975); Marine Drilling Co. Inc. v. Aulin, 363
F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1966); Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966);
including the Sedco 135 in Loftis v. Southeastern Drilling Inc., 43 F.R.D. 32 (E.D. La.
1967).
58. 472 F.2d 999, 1000 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 868 (1973).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1002.
61. Id.

62. Id.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY

risks of navigation while in transit and to risks of blowouts while in
operation. It has travelled many miles in long distance tows on the high seas,
transporting equipment from place to place on navigable waters. Thus, Sedco
135 arguably falls within the Act's definition of vessel. Alternatively, if the
Court focuses upon the stationary status of the rig while in operation, upon
its lack of self-propulsion, and upon its failure to travel for the purpose of
"commerce," then Sedco 135 would apparently not be found to qualify as a
vessel.
The Fifth Circuit in DresserIndustries v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York,61 recently found a mobile drilling "jack-up" rig to be a fixed object, and
not a vessel." The self-elevating offshore drilling unit was conducting drilling
operations. The Court stressed the stationary character of the rig at the time
of the collision with Dresser's diesel supply vessel.6 The Court explained that
the rationale mandating liberal interpretation of Jones Act cases was
inapplicable in that case.6 The decision was based on the Court's interpretation of the insurance contract existing between Dresser and Fidelity &
Casualty CoY' The insurance deductible was $100 thousand for collisions
with fixed objects, as opposed to $200 thousand for collisions with vessels.6
The Court reasoned that the contract's differentiation in deductible amounts
was due to the parties' recognition that the risk of collision between an
ocean-going vessel and another ship was greater than the risk of the vessel
colliding with a fixed structure.69 Hence, the Court's decision was dictated by
the evidence of which risks the parties themselves had assumed in their
contract.
In contrast, the Sedco case is not concerned with the expectations of
parties to a written contract, but rather with the liability for a negligent oil
spill where the rig owner is attempting to make use of the provisions of the
Limitation Act to greatly reduce his liability. The Fifth Circuit cases
addressing the Limitation of Liability Act do not offer clear guidelines as to
whether a semisubmersible drilling rig will be considered a vessel. Assuming
the Court finds the Limitation Act inapplicable - either because the cause of
the accident was "within the privity and knowledge" of the rig owner or
because the rig cannot be considered a "vessel" - the provisions of the

63. 580 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 807.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Federal Water Pollution Control Act"0 may offer limited relief to the federal
government.
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Ac
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter "FWPCA") is the
2
1972 Amendment to the 1970 Water Quality Improvement Act. The Clean
73
Water Act of 1977 amended the FWPCA; the 1977 Act provides that the
owner or operator of an offshore facility shall be liable to the United States
for the actual costs of oil removal, not to exceed $50 million." If the discharge
was the result of willful negligence or misconduct within the privity and
knowledge of the owner, the owner or operator will be liable for the full
amount of the removal costs.7" The amount of the removal costs will include
any expenses incurred by the Federal Government or State" in the
restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a
result of the oil discharge."
The compensation provisions of the FWPCA apparently do not apply,
however, because of the Act's definition of "offshore facility." Under the Act,
an offshore facility is "in, on, or under, any of the navigable waters of the
'7
The
United States," or "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
"navigable waters of the United States" extend only to the three mile
territorial sea limit.' The legislative intent was, in fact, to extend the Act's
jurisdiction to a two hundred mile limit.n The Sedco rig was operating six
hundred miles from the United States coast,"1 unquestionably beyond the
jurisdiction of the Act. Thus, the Sedco rig is not an offshore facility within
the meaning of the Act. The FWPCA is inapplicable to the Sedco dispute.
Were the Act to be found applicable to the Sedco case, the FWPCA's
provisions would satisfy the United States' and the State's claim for cleanup

70.
71.
72.
73.

33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1977).

74. Id. at § 1321(f)(3).
75. Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

33 U.S.C. § 1321(e)(2)(H).
Id. at § 1321(f)(4).
Id. at § 1321(0)(2).
Id. at § 1321(0)(3).

80. S. REP. No. 95-370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
& AD. NEWS 4326, 4390.

CODE

CONG.

81. This approximate figure was extrapolated from geographical coordinates cited
in Original Claim of Tex., supra note 1, at 2.
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costs, but they would offer no compensation to the private parties who have
been damaged by the pollution. The State may be reimbursed from the fund
for cleanup costs it incurred." Furthermore, the state or local government is
not preempted from imposing liability on the polluter, through its own
compensation statute, provided its terms are not in conflict with those of the
FWPCA.Y In the instant case, Texas does not have a compensation statute
specifically tailored to redress the damage caused by the Ixtoc I blowout.
However, the State's civil" and criminal pollution penalties' will be
sufficiently compensatory of its $175 thousand cleanup expenses.
C.

Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act6

7
The Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund established by the terms of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments (hereinafter "OSCLA") of
19788 also cannot afford relief. The Act extends United States jurisdiction
89
solely to offshore facilities located on the Outer Continental Shelf. The Shelf
is defined as "the submerged lands lying seaward of the territorial sea of
which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction and control." Article 24 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone" provides that a state's jurisdiction
is to extend to the twelve mile contiguous zone only as necessary to control
infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations within
its territory or territorial sea.9 2 As the Sedco rig lies well beyond the
contiguous zone, the jurisdictional requirements of the Act bar application of
the recovery provisions of OCSLA.

82. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(2)(H).
83. Id. at § 1321 (0)(2).
84. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 26.122 (Vernon) (1972). Civil penalties range
from a minimum of $50 to a maximum of $1000 for each act of violation and for each

day of violation or injunctive relief.
85. Criminal penalties range from a minimum of $10 to a maximum of $1000 for
each day that the violation occurs. Id. § 26.213. If the discharge was willful or negligent from a point source (a drilling rig is within the definition of "point source"), then a
fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed upon conviction. Id. § 26.212(c).
86. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1953).
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(8) (1978).
88. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. (1978).

89. Id. at § 1811 (18).
90. 43 U.S.C. 1331(a) and 43 U.S.C. 1301(a)(1) and (2).
91. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, in force Sept. 10,

1964.
92. Id. Art. 24.
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If the Amendments were applicable, they would provide funds for oil
removal" and, unlike the provisions of the FWPCA, would also make funds
available for damage to public or private interests caused by such discharges.
Claims may be asserted for injury to or destruction of real or personal
property, 91 loss of use of real or personal property,' loss of use of natural
7
resourcese and loss of tax revenue due to such injury. Claimants may be
United States private citizens or a State." Thus, if this spill had occurred
from drilling on the United States portion of the continental shelf, all the
claims asserted in this case would be compensable. In contrast to the liability
limitations of the FWPCA, the OCSLA Amendments provide absolute
liability for State and Federal Government cleanup costs." Removal costs
incurred by 'ther parties -are limited to $35. million."'" Private claims are to
°
be presented to the owner, operator or guarantor.' ' If full and adequate
compensation is unavailable because the owner is financially incapable of
meeting all obligations, a claim for uncompensated damages may be
presented to the Fund. 2
As this blowout occurred on the high seas and is, therefore, not within
the purview of the FWPCA or the OCSLA Amendments, the parties are
relegated to the only remaining existing legislation which has been applied
to oil polluters, i.e., Section 13 of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appropriations
Act," popularly known as the Refuse Act."
D.

The Refuse Act'

5

The Refuse Act prohibits any discharge of refuse matter from or out of
any floating craft of any. kind into the navigable waters of the United
States. 1' The Act is applicable to both vessels and offshore facilities and

93. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(a).
94. Id., at § 1813(a)(2)(19).
95. Id., at § 1813(a)(2)(B).
96. Id., at § 1813(a)(2)(D).
97. Id., at § 1813(a)(2)(F).
98. Id., at § 1813(b)(2), (b)(5).
99. Id., at § 1814(a). This liability is limited under certain circumstances. See 43
U.S.C. § 1814(b) and (c). The FWPCA imposes a $50 million dollar maximum for government cleanup costs if there is no willful negligence. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(k).
100. 43 U.S.C. 1814(b)(2).
101. Id., at § 1817(a).
102. Id., at § 1817(d).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1899).
104. Id., at §§ 407-411.
105. Id.
106. Id., at § 407.
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jurisdiction is not limited to facilities located within the United States
territorial sea or contiguous zone. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Standard Oil"7 held that oil is "refuse" within the meaning of the Act."
While the Act's flexibility of application would appear to make it the suitable
method through which the parties may seek a remedy for their injuries, the
Act does not provide adequate compensation to the injured parties in the
event of a major oilspill. Intended as a preventative measure, the Act
punishes violators with a criminal penalty of up to $2,500 or imprisonment of
one month to one year, or both.' 9 The payment of such a sum could hardly be
considered sufficient to act as either a deterrent to the business of oil
exploration today, or as adequate compensation for injury incurred as a
result of an oilspill.
A different section of the Rivers and Harbors Act has been expanded by
judicial interpretation to afford greater relief to the federal government than
the provisions of the Act allow. Section 15, popularly known as the Wreck
Act,"0 requires removal by the owner of a sunken craft."' If the sunken craft
is not removed within thirty days and it constitutes an obstruction to
navigable waters of the United States, the Secretary of the Army may
dispose of it at his discretion."' The owner is not indemnified from the
proceeds of sale. Criminal penalties are also available against violators."'
While an oilspill is clearly not within the purview of the Wreck Act,
consideration of the Act is appropriate as an example of judicial expansion of
existing remedies in favor of the federal government. If the Court were
willing to similarly expand the relief granted pursuant to the Refuse Act, it
would serve as a vehicle for recovery of federal government cleanup costs.
In Wyandotte Co. v. U.S.,'" the Supreme Court held that the remedies
and procedures for enforcement of Section 15 are not exclusive and do not
foreclose in personam relief against a party who negligently sinks a vessel in
a navigable waterway."' Wyandotte granted the federal government standing
to sue in personam for costs incurred in removing a barge which sank with a
deadly cargo of liquid chlorine while being pushed on the Mississippi River."'
The Court reasoned that criminal liability was inadequate to ensure the full

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

384 U.S. 224 (1966).
Id., at 230.
See 33 U.S.C. § 411.
Id. at § 409.
Id.
Id., at §§ 414-415.
Id., at § 411.
389 U.S. 191 (1967).
Id. at 200-201.
Id. at 194.
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effectiveness of the statute as Congress intended." 7 The maximum $2,500
fine and the Government's in rem rights would not serve to reimburse the
United States for removal expenses."' Furthermore, denying in personam
relief to the Government would permit the extraordinary result of a
wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto
his victim. The Court found the Government met the necessary requirements
for standing: (1) the the interest of the United States fell within the class
that the statute was intended to protect; (2) the harm that had occurred was
of the type the statute was intended to forestall."' Consequently, the Court
considered the civil action proper, despite the criminal language of the
statute. n2 The United States thus gained a private right of action in the
context of obstructions in U.S. navigable waters.
A similar analysis is applicable to oil pollution from a blowout under the
Refuse Act. In examining the legislative intent behind the Act, the Standard
Oil Court clarified the definition of "serious injury" to United States
watercourses; such injury included serious injury caused by pollution."'
Pollution is one of the harms the statute was intended to forestall. The
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Republic Steel Corp."2 reiterated the well
established principle that the navigable waters are to be deemed the public
property of the nation, and subject to the requisite legislation by Congress."
Thus, the United States government is the principal beneficiary of the Act. If
the federal government was granted standing to recover its costs of removing
a barge from a navigable waterway under the Wreck Act, it would seem only
consistent to grant it standing to recover its cleanup costs for its oil removal
operations. Otherwise, subjecting the polluters merely to the $2,500 fine
would result in the responsibility of the pollution damage being shifted to the
victims, the United States of America and the State of Texas.
Alternatively, the Court in the Sedco case may not be willing to expand
the remedies applicable under the terms of the Refuse Act as the Supreme
Court was in Wyandotte. The Wreck Act specifically granted the government
in rem remedies. Hence, expansion to in personam remedies was not radical
or inconsistent with the purposes of the Act. The Refuse Act, in contrast, does
not provide for government compensation. Expanding a purely criminal
penalty to a civil penalty represents a far greater step than expanding a
pre-existing civil penalty.
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Another critical distinction is that the owners in Wyandotte were clearly
willfully negligent in abandoning their barge; evidence establishing that
Sedco or Permargo were guilty of the same degree of wrongdoing as the
owners in Wyandotte may be difficult to obtain. Finally, both private and
State parties are disadvantaged under the Refuse Act. Since only the federal
government qualifies as "within the class the statute was intended to
protect," the Act is an insufficient vehicle for recovery for all injured parties.
Thus, the Refuse Act may provide a limited form of relief, i.e., cleanup costs
for the federal government, but only if the Court is willing to expand the
existing penalties to include civil relief and grant the government a private
right of action, as the Supreme Court did in Wyandotte.
In summary, domestic legislation does not provide sufficient relief from
the damage caused by a blowout on the high seas. The Limitation of Liability
Act remains in effect, arguably vitiating the provisions of more recent
statutes such as the FWPCA and the OCSLA. Although the latter Acts are
intended to compensate victims of oil spills, they overlap, and their
jurisdiction is restricted to two hundred miles offshore. Application of the
Refuse Act is totally dependent on judicial interpretation of the purpose of
the Act. Hence, none of the parties can rely on existing legislation for relief.
III.

COMMON LAW REMEDIES

There remains the possibility of applying traditional common law
concepts of negligence and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities
as a basis for recovery to both governmental and private parties.
A.

The State

A widely accepted theory for state standing to sue is that of a parens
patriae suit. Under the parenspatriae theory the state may maintain a cause
of action for injury to its proprietary interests as owner and/or trustee for the
citizens of the state of the natural resources lying in or adjacent to its coastal
waters. 24 The Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut" 5 found that a state's
right to preserve its natural resources flows from the existence of the state's
police power." However the theory does not include recovery by the state for
the benefit of individuals whose property was damaged.'
124. See State of Maine v. MN Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1lQ2, (S.D. Me. 1973).
State of Maryland, Dept. of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1060, 1067 (Md. 1972); California State Dept. of Fish and Game v. S.S. Bournemouth,
307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
125. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
126. Id. at 534.
127. Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938).
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Secondly, the state may argue for recovery on a theory of public
nuisance. Nuisance requires proof of "substantial and unreasonable" interference with the use and enjoyment of one's property."i The discharge of tar
balls and slick onto the state's beaches arguably constitutes a substantial and
unreasonable interference with their use. One question asked to determine
whether the damage is so substantial as to amount to a nuisance is whether
its nature is continuous or recurring."i There is authority qualifying a one
hundred twenty-two day onslaught of air pollution as "continuous and
recurring."'13 As this spill has intermittently polluted the Texas shores for
nine months, it could well be considered continuous and recurring. In order
for the state to sustain its burden of proof it would need to establish that
Sedco or Pemex-Permargo intentionally acted without due care. However, the
Court may have difficulty in establishing any generally accepted standard of
care against which to measure Sedco's conduct in a relatively new activity
such as offshore drilling. Furthermore, Sedco's sinking of the rig has
effectively destroyed any discoverable evidence from the rig itself. The
language barrier will also complicate efforts to gather proof of negligence.
Finally,,the state may institute a tort action for injury resulting from an
abnormally dangerous activity. The Restatement (Second) of Torts131 lists the
factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous, and thus subject to strict liability:
(a)

existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm resulting from the activity will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.3 '
Given the relatively minor rate of blowout occurrences, offshore oil exploration does not clearly involve a high degree of risk of harm to the marine
environment. The gravity of the harm depends upon the conditions that exist
in each blowout, and the difficulty of capping the particular spill. Whether

PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 595 (4th Ed. 1971).
129. Id. at 579-580.
130. In Re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1966).
132. Id., at § 520.

128. W.
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the risk can be eliminated by due care is unclear. Sometimes the most
sophisticated equipment cannot gauge precise geological conditions with
exactitude. The activity is not of common usage, as it is not carried on by any
large percentage of the population.' The activity may be considered
appropriate to the locality: drillers have no choice in their selection of
locality; oil drilling must be carried on where oil is to be found."u The value of
the activity to the community as the source of much needed energy may well
vitiate the other ultrahazardous aspects of the activity. Thus, application of
the Restatement 2d test does not clearly establish offshore oil exploration as
an abnormally dangerous activity. However, balancing the possible risks
against the value of the activity, the Court may find that the value of
offshore oil drilling operations outweighs the risks involved.
In summary, a parens patriae suit seems the least problematic option
open to the State to sustain its claim of compensable injury. Negligence and
nuisance theories present evidentiary difficulties. Success in applying the
Restatement 2d test for an abnormally dangerous activity depends upon
judicial weighing of the risks against the value of the activity to the
community..

.

.

.

B. Private Parties
The landmark case of Union Oil v. Oppen'35 held that the dimunition of
aquatic life in the Santa Barbara Channel as a result of an offshore blowout
constituted a legally compensable injury to commercial fishermen for lost
profits. " The Court found the fishermen had the requisite privity to
maintain a negligence action against the oil drillers. 37 The Court reasoned
that the defendants could reasonably have foreseen damage to the aquatic
life as a result of their negligently conducted drilling operations.'" Thus, the
consequential injury to the business of commercial fishermen was foreseeable. Recovery was limited to the fishermen's demonstrable loss of profits,
suggesting that losses suffered by other businesses in the area would not be
compensable. 39 American courts have usually denied claims for economic

133. Id., at § 520(d). See Comment on clause (d).
134. Id.
135. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).

136. Id. at 570.
137. Id. at 569.

138. id.
139. Id. at 570.
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losses suffered by non-riparian businesses which indirectly depend upon
fishing, water recreation or beach tourism as sources of income.'
There is authority in Texas recognizing the right of a plaintiff who
operated a swimming pool in the channel of a river to recover lost profits
resulting from defendant's pollution of the river.'' Other jurisdictions have
found that damage to a hotel's private beach was recoverable."' The most
far-reaching decision to date, Petition of N.J. Barging Corp.,' 3 granted
owners of waterfront homes damages for depreciation in rental values,
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort and loss of aesthetic pleasure.",
In summary, among the private parties, the beach owners and other
small businesses dependent on tourism are not likely to succeed in alleging a
compensable injury under traditional tort law. Only fishermen with demonstrable loss of profits due to the oilspill may recover on a negligence theory if
the Court adopts the Union Oil reasoning.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The United States may seek relief in the International Court of Justice
for Mexico's violations of international law. The sources for opinio juris as
defined in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases'5 are judicial opinions,
treaties, United Nations activities, declarations of regional organizations,
municipal law and International Law Association commentaries."
A.

Judicial Opinions

In the Trail Smelter Arbitration"7 between the United States and
Canada, the principle of customary international law, sic utere tuo,"8 was
applied. The Court in the Trail Smelter case held that no state has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by

140. See e.g. Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968);
Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Oh. 1946); Sinram v. Pa. RR, 61 F.2d
767 (2d Cir. 1932); H.R. Moch Co. v. Renssalaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 1960, 159 N.E.
869 (N.Y. 1928).
141. Fort Worth & Rio Grande Railway Co. v. Hancock, 286 S.W. 335, 336 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926).
142. Small v. U.S., 33 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir. 1964).
143. 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
144. Id. at 936-937.
145. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 119691 I.C.J. 1.
146. Id. at 44.
147. Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 1905 (1949); 35 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 684 (1941).
148. One must so use his own as not to do injury to another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Ed. 1978).
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fumes in or to the territory of another or the property of persons therein." '
The case must be of serious consequence, and the injury established by clear
and convincing evidence." Canada was held liable for damages to the United
States for injury in the State of Washington resulting from a privately owned
and operated Canadian smelter.'
Water pollution is certainly analogous to air pollution, and the
consequences are arguably more readily ascertainable. The damage originated from the operations of Mexico's national oil company on Mexico's
continental shelf over which it has sovereign rights. Mexico is more directly
responsible for the oil pollution of the State of Texas and of the waters of the
United States than Canada was for air pollution of the State of Washington.
In the instant case, the Mexican national oil company and its subcontractors,
rather than a private corporation, are implicated. The consequences of this
oil spill are clearly serious, and injury did, in fact, occur. An analogy to Trail
Smelter indicates Mexican liability for the damage to United States coastal
waters and resources resulting from the exploration activities of the Mexican
national oil company on its territorial waters.
B.

United Nations Activities

Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration," 2 one of the final documents
of the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, essentially
reiterated the sic utere tuo principle.
Principle 21 states that countries have the responsibility to insure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or to areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." A Mexican delegate, in quoting the Mexican minister of
foreign affairs, stated unambiguously that "it was the responsibility of all
states to avoid activities within their jurisdiction or control which might
cause damage to the environment beyond their national frontiers and to
repair any damage caused."'' In the light of such a statement, there is no
question that Mexico has a definite international legal obligation towards the
United States for the pollution resulting from Mexican drilling operations.
Principle 21 does not represent the notion of strict liability for
extraterritorial environmental damage. There is evidence from the debates in
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drafting Principle 21 that some measure of negligence must be established
before recovery is awarded."i Principle 22 mandates that states further
develop international law regarding liability and compensation." Principle
22 thus recognizes by implication that there is as yet no established practice
of compensation for environmental damage.
The requirement of negligence for recovery is in conformity with
international case law. In the Corfu Channel case,157 Albania was held liable
for the property damage and loss of human life which resulted from minefield
explosions in Albanian territorial waters. Liability was contingent, however,
on knowledge of the existence of the mines."s Knowledge was inferred from
the fact that the mines must have been laid at a time when there was close
Albanian surveillance over the Strait.'59 In the instant case, however, the
Court may find it difficult to establish that the operators were capable of
gauging the precise geological conditions which gave rise to the blowout.
Recovery on the basis of international judicial opinion thus presents the same
evidentiary difficulties that would be encountered in a negligence suit in an
American or Mexican court.
C. Regional Declarations
Mexico has declared its obligation to prevent pollution of the sea by oil
exploration and exploitation in a number of regional declarations. The
Declaration of Santo Domingo affirmed Mexico's duty to refrain from
performing acts which may pollute the sea and its seabed, either inside or
outside its jurisdiction." °
Mexico also approved the Lima Declaration of the Latin American States
on the Law of the Sea.'"' The Lima Declaration recognizes in its prefactory
language that the coastal states should take steps to protect the health and
interests of their populations from utilization of the marine environment.
Such utilization has given rise to grave dangers of contamination of the
waters and disturbance of the ecological balance.'62 The introduction declares

155. See HANDL, The Case for Mexican Liability for TransnationalPollution Damage Resulting from the Ixtoc I Oilspill, 2 HOUSTON J. OF INT'L. L. 229, 232 (1979).
156. Id. at 232-233.
157. Corfu Channel Case [1949], I.C.J. 4.
158. Id. at 22.
159. Id. 22-23.
160. Declaration of Santo Domingo, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/2 601 (1972).
161. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea (Lima), reprinted in 10 INT'L. LEGAL MATS. 207 (1971).
162. Id.
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that in exercising its sovereign rights of exploration of the seabed, the states
must mutually respect the rights of other neighboring coastal states."
Mexico signed the Montevideo Declaration of the Law of the Sea' in
1970. The Montevideo Declaration resolved that the signatory states take
measures to establish a system of liability for the resulting damages from
exploration and exploitation activities."
Thus, Mexico cannot claim it owes no duty to compensate the United
States for pollution of its waters. Mexico has repeatedly affirmed its
obligation to prevent pollution, respect the rights of neighboring coastal
states, and establish a system of liability.
D.

InternationalConventions

Mexico may be liable for violations of Conventions to which both Mexico
and the United States are parties. Both are signatories to the 1958
Convention on the High Seas.'6 Article 24 of the Convention provides:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by
the discharge of oil . . . resulting from the exploitation and exploration
of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions
on the subject.
Although the government of Mexico has pertinent regulations in
accordance with the Convention, the 1958 Convention has little practical
significance. The Convention is not self-executing, relying on the signatory
states to enforce their own regulations. Mexico cannot be forced to impose
damages on its oil exploitation contractors.
Mexico and the United States have similarly signed the Convention on
the Continental Shelf.67 Article 5 of the Convention provides that the
exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf must not result
in any unjustifiable interference with conservation of the living resources of
the sea. By endangering both the shrimp spawning grounds and the already
endangered Kemp's ridley sea turtle nesting grounds in the Texas waters,'68
Mexico has violated Article 5.
163. Id. at 208.
164. Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in 9 INrr'L LEGAL
MATS. 1081 (1970).
165. Id.
166. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, Article 24.
167. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, in force June 10, 1964.
168. 125 CONGR. REC. H. No. 6366-67 (Jul. 20, 1979).
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Similarly, Article 1(2) of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas,'' to which Mexico and the United
States are signatories, provides that all states have the duty to adopt or
cooperate with other states in adopting such measures for their nations as
may be necessary for conservation of the living resources of the high seas.
The Sedco case demonstrates that Mexico has adopted the required policies of
Article 1(2); unfortunately, the country has failed to adopt the requisite
practical measures to enforce the terms of the Convention.
In summary, Mexico has been eager to be a party to regional and
international declarations and conventions which assert a country's responsibility to ensure that exploitation of its natural resources does not lead to
contamination of the environment of other nation states. However, as the
conventions are not self-executing, and as all of the declarations rely on the
good faith efforts of the signatories for compliance, these documents
represent nothing more than statements of good intentions. The duties are
present, but if a State refuses to enforce the Conventions' requirements upon
itself, nothing can be done to compel its compliance. Furthermore, the
International Court of Justice only acquires jurisdiction over a State if that
State consents to the Court's jurisdiction.'70 Thus far, Mexico has denied
responsibility for the consequences of the Ixtoc I oil spill;'' in light of these
denials, the country's voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
International Court would appear highly unlikely.
V. MEXIcAN LAW
Lastly, all the party plaintiffs may file claims in the Mexican Courts.
The accident constitutes a violation of both Mexican tort law and its
petroleum operation regulations. Mexican tort law, similar to our negligence
law, imposes liability for damages arising out of "illicit acts or acts contrary
to good customs", unless the damage is caused by the fault or inexplicable
negligence of the victim.'72 A blowout arguably constitutes an "illicit act."
The victims also may allege the drilling was conducted contrary to industry
standards. Again, however, the burden of proof would be difficult to sustain
73
for a finding of negligence.'
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Mexico imposes absolute liability upon those who engage in ultrahazardous activities. These are defined as "apparatus . . . which are
dangerous in themselves, by reason of the velocity which they develop, their
explosive or inflammable nature. .. ""' The operation of a semisubmersible
rig would appear to fall within this definition. The rigs develop pressure
("velocity") during the drilling; the oil and gases which spew forth during the
blowout are inflammable.
The blowout might be considered a violation of the Regulations for
Petroleum Operations. The Regulations mandate that during drilling work
all necessary equipment be installed to guarantee the safety of the
operation.175 All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid environmental
contamination as well as accidents and risk-taking in the course of the
drilling.17 However, the measure of damages which may be awarded for
inadequate safeguards or unfounded risk-taking is not clear.
In summary, given the problems of substantive and procedural conflicts
of laws, the great expense involved in pursuing claims in Mexican courts, the
language barrier, the difficult burden of proof and the uncertainty of gaining
any substantial measure of damages, seeking recovery in the Mexican Courts
would not appear to be worthwhile for the United States government, the
State of Texas or the private parties involved.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, domestic legislation must be altered to ensure recovery
from offshore blowout damage. The antiquated Limitation of Liability Act
should be repealed. The Act creates confusion, forces an inordinate amount of
time and money to be spent on preliminary jurisdictional questions," and
often leads to inequitable results because of artificial "vessel" classifications.
The original purpose of the Act was to protect the United States merchant
marine's ability to compete with that of Great Britain; 8 this purpose can
better be served by specific legislation requiring that ships be adequately
insured. Thus, the companies engaging in these activities could be required
to build into their production costs the cost of self-insurance to cover not only
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176. Id.
177. More than a year will have elapsed in the Sedco case before the jurisdiction
issues are determined.
178. 23 CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 714 (Remarks of Sen. Davis) (1851).

THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE JOURNAL

the cost of replacing a destroyed rig, but also any compensation for damaged
resources and private property for which they might be held liable.
Alternatively, should Congress adopt a national policy designed to
encourage oil exploration to obtain much needed energy, it might enact
compromise legislation similar to the Superfund bill. " 9 In exchange for strict
liability for cleanup expenses as well as for private property damage and
economic losses,'" the companies may look to the fund to cover any amounts
over $50 million, for which their insurance would be inadequate.'"' Since the
fund is constituted of money from federal taxes imposed upon oil refineries
and terminals,'82 oil owners are to reimburse the refineries and terminals for
these taxes. Thus, oil companies as a class contribute towards compensation
for damage caused by a member of the class.
Finally, it is in both Mexico's and the United States' interest to conclude
a bilateral agreement similar to that existing between the United States and
Canada. The United States will be anxious to substitute Mexican oil for the
loss of supplies from the strife-torn Middle East. Mexico needs to retain the
goodwill of the American companies that supply Pemex with necessary
equipment and technological instruction. Such an agreement might impose
strict liability for any pollution damage resulting from offshore oil drilling
operations, leaving it to each country to determine whether government or
industry will be responsible for these costs.
In the United States, the companies engaging in oil exploration need
some certainty as to the scope of their liability. Without this certainty they
cannot determine what amounts to build into their production costs.
Hopefully Congress will adopt legislation soon so as to resolve the questions
of liability and limitations thereon in such a way that the financial resources
of either government or industry are not overburdened.
Hilde D. Preston
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